I originally wrote this as my part of my application to Princeton University which was also incomplete (and still is). I should perhaps copy part of the post in relation to the problems which misdiagnosing individuals with psychosis causes in that it provides necessary context. You may wish to skip this section which is highlighted if you have already read it.
Let us state that an entity known as entity A finds it convenient, according to a generally policy, for individual B to be diagnosed with a form of psychosis, even though his EPR, which is publicly known, invalidates such a diagnosis.
An obvious concern would be that the research studies performed by the SRI make access to scientific data of an objective, precise and verifiable kind in relation to PR and psychosis, publicly available. In addition, through the usage of modern technology and big data, knowledge of the correlation will become increasingly available. As such, it would be difficult to sustain the view that such a diagnosis could be credible in the eye of the public.
One might ask whether such a policy is to the advantage of entity A to misdiagnose individuals, given the following very probable situations:
- A rival of entity A, which we shall call Entity C does not have a policy to define such individuals as psychotic. Their policy is instead to take advantage of the abilities and intelligence of such individuals. The difference between their approaches to those with EPR means they are stronger than Entity A.
- Entity C wishes to seek advantage and to damage entity A by enticing individual B to work for them through a recognition of their abilities and through informing them that they are not experiencing psychosis.
- Furthermore, in order to damage the reputation of entity A, entity C makes it publicly known that individual B is being deliberately harmed by entity A.
One might argue that entity A could attempt to suppress knowledge of the fact that EPR negates the possibility of psychosis. It is however difficult to forsee how this could be achieved given that:
- It is doubtful whether entity A could persuade entity C or other entities to suppress knowledge of this correlation when it would be to their advantage not to do so. It is also doubtful whether entity C would suppress knowledge of that correlation as they would be able to cause reputation damage to entity A and to attract others like individual B.
- Through the increasingly availability of modern communications, it is difficult to see how the available data and knowledge of the correlation will not at some stage, become public knowledge. The policy of entity A will be become apparent to the public which would damage it in their eyes. As a consequence, there is a probability that others with EPR would look towards other entities.
- Each country wishes to gain competitive advantage through the scientific discoveries which are made by intelligent people. It remains difficult to see how each one of the 196 countries in the world can all agree to cooperate for the first time on concealing such a discovery especially given that countries like Russia do not employ such a system. In a competitive international environment, it is logical to expect that at least one country will choose not to deny but instead to take advantage of those who are highly intelligent but have witnessed/been subject to a system of surveillance and who as a consequence are labeled by the authorities as psychotic in order to discredit them and to conceal this system of surveillance.
As a consequence of the fact that the correlation is and will increasingly become public knowledge, one might like to ask the following questions:
- In cases where it is deemed advantageous for entity A to state that an individual with EPR is psychotic, how can they be aware of their level of EPR beforehand given that such data is not always currently available? In disregarding such measures, how can they avoid the possibility of encouraging that person to go toward entity C?
- How does one avoid a situation where those with EPR through such abilities notice that those with a low level of PR are being subject to incorrect treatment and encourage them to work for entity C?
- What would happen when an individual with EPR who is misdiagnosed with psychosis, realises the correlation and decides to take revenge by for example leaking information.
The conclusion which must be drawn is that it would be disadvantageous for entity A to have a general policy that for the sake of convenience, certain individuals should be diagnosed with psychosis.
In addition to the fact that would appear self-defeating to have a policy on the part of a state to diagnose individuals with a form of psychosis where that person complaints about human methods of surveillance which are currently concealed, one should also factor in a following seemingly unrelated consideration; it is probable that, in the not too distant future, artificial Intelligence will have sufficient capabilities to discover when individuals are telling the truth about what they perceive and that as such this objective determination of truth renders any counterclaim invalid.
As such, a policy by a state to ensure that, despite evidence to the contrary, individuals are deemed to be experiencing psychosis or to not be telling the truth about a the abuse by systems of surveillance would not appear to be a sustainable approach.
Consideration must therefore be given to alternatives.
Although I do not have the requisite expertise with regard to game theory and my conclusion is in all probability wrong as well as being somewhat incomplete, it is perhaps worth bearing in mind however that despite having no qualifications with regard to psychology, my conclusion that a high level of certain aspects of cognitive functioning negates the possibility of psychosis was confirmed by the Schizophrenia Research institute of Australia.
The best solution to the above problem would appear to be to imitate entity C. This evidently is at variance with the economic theory that best result comes from everyone in a group doing what is best for himself. It is also somewhat different in terms of its emphasis from current economic theory which states the best result comes from doing what is best for the group and oneself and which is perhaps questionable in that it appears to have formed some of the basis for the nuclear arms race in the late twentieth century.
Given the potential actions in the problem outlined above of Entity C with regard to those with a high level of ability, the best solution can only come when, out of self-interest, we attempt in the first instance to look after the interests of others who might be attracted by a rival entity due to policy of entity A, to repress intelligence for political reasons, out of a misguided sense of self-interest.
With less intelligence overall in a society, it is difficult to see how ones self-interest can be served in that such a society is necessarily weaker when faced with a society with more intelligence and by extension of this ones own self-interest is affected through the environment. One can imagine a situation in which there will be a race where out of self-interest, both entities must look towards the interests of others.
Our self-interest must therefore be necessarily be contingent upon (or to use a mathematical term, a dependent variable of) the interests of others such as individual B. That self-interest is not, as stated by the Nash equilibrium, equivalent to but is dependent upon the interests of others.
In order to attract such individuals, it would seem that prime consideration should be given to our own personal behaviour as well as interactions with others as opposed to, in the first instance, considerations of self-interest.